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Abstract 
In the empirical literature, monetary policy shocks are commonly measured as an innovation 
to a short-term nominal interest rate. In contrast, the majority of monetary business cycle 
models treats a broad monetary aggregate as the central bank’s policy measure. We try 
overcome this disparity and present a business cycle model which allows to examine the 
effects of innovations to a non-contingent nominal interest rate rule. To obtain unique rational 
expectations equilibria we assume that changes in money supply are brought about open 
market operations. In addition to working capital, we consider staggered prices which 
enables real marginal costs to vary. Consistent with the empirical findings of Barth and 
Ramey (2000), the model predicts that real marginal cost and inflation rise in response to 
positive interest rate innovations. The mechanism corresponds to their ‘Cost Channel of 
Monetary Transmission’ and replicates typical monetary VAR results, including the puzzling 
behavior of prices. 
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1 Introduction
What happens when an unanticipated rise in the nominal interest rate, which is commonly
labeled a contractionary monetary policy shock, hits the economy? On the one hand, there
is a large empirical literature presenting estimated vector autoregressive (VAR) models
trying to reveal monetary policy e®ects.1 In most of these studies monetary policy shocks
are identi¯ed with innovations to the federal funds rate by imposing restrictions derived
from macroeconomic theory. On the other hand, in modern monetary business cycle theory
researchers develop quantitative dynamic general equilibrium models in order to study the
transmission mechanism of monetary policy.2 The majority of the studies, which focus
on the responses to monetary policy shocks, assume that the central bank controls the
growth rate of a broad monetary aggregate.
The di®erence between these two monetary policy measures becomes apparent with
the so-called liquidity puzzle and the price puzzle. Monetary policy should lead to a
negative correlation between nominal interest rates and monetary aggregates, i.e., the
liquidity e®ect. While the liquidity e®ect can be observed in the impulse responses to
federal funds rate VAR innovations, monetary business cycle models were initially unable
to replicate this negative correlation. In order to eliminate this de¯ciency, models with
¯nancial market trading frictions, i.e., limited participation, were developed.3 In contrast,
the price puzzle, which was raised by Sims (1992), is entirely an empirical phenomenon,
or to be more pronounced, an empirical anomaly. What is meant by the price puzzle, is
the protracted rise in the price level in response to a monetary contraction which is found
in numerous VARs studies. The view that this ¯nding should be an anomaly is supported
by practically the entire monetary theory. As a solution to this puzzle, a sensitive price
index is often introduced into VARs which adds to the information set of the monetary
policy reaction function. By applying such an identi¯cation scheme for monetary policy
shocks, Sims (1992) showed that the price anomaly can be reduced, though it can not
completely be removed in VARs.4 As a strategy for an appropriate selection between
competing identi¯cation schemes Christiano et al. (1999) advocated to
"eliminate a policy shock measure if it implies a set of impulse response functions that is inconsistent
with every element in the set of monetary models that we wish to discriminate between. This is equivalent
to announcing that if none of the models that we are interested in can account for the qualitative features
of a set of impulse response functions, we reject the corresponding identi¯cation assumption, not the entire
set of models." (p. 70)
The purpose of the paper is to take this approach literally. For this, we understand
it as a prerequisite to consider a measure for monetary policy shocks in a business cycle
model which corresponds to the shock measure in VARs, namely, innovations to a short-
run nominal interest rate. This assumption is clearly not new in the monetary business
1See Bernanke and Mihov (1998), and Christiano et al. (1999) for the presentation of VAR estimates
using di®erent approaches and for summarizing the current state of the literature.
2Examples are Yun (1996), Chari et al. (1996), Christiano et al. (1997), Bergin and Feenstra (1998),
Jeanne (1998), or Huang and Liu (1999) to name but a few.
3See, e.g., Lucas (1990), Fuerst (1992), and Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992).
4Respective point estimates reveal that a small initial rise of the GDP de°ator often remains even in
the presence of a sensitive price index (see, e.g., Uhlig, 1999, and Christiano et al., 1996, 1999). See also
Hanson's (2000) results which cast severe doubt on this price puzzle 'solution'.
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cycle literature. Recently, several authors apply interest rate rules and in a few cases
they identify monetary policy shocks with innovations to these rules.5 These studies are
predominantly meant to study the business cycle behavior when the central bank employs
a contingent monetary policy rule, such as the Taylor-Rule.6 Though, contingent interest
rate rules are evidently more realistic, we apply a non-contingent interest rate rule in order
to allow for an analysis of the genuine transmission mechanism of pure interest rate shocks.
The questions we try to help answering could be articulated as follows: Is the price puzzle,
which does not completely disappear in the impulse response functions of many VARs,
really an empirical anomaly? Or, should prices actually rise when ¯rms' optimal price
setting is directly a®ected by rising interest rates, e.g, via interest payments on loans? To
give a preview, our ¯ndings indicate that the asymmetry between the policy measure in
empirical and theoretical studies is primarily responsible for puzzling results in monetary
policy analysis.
The model in this paper is mainly motivated by a recent paper of Barth and Ramey
(2000), titled: "The Cost Channel of Monetary Transmission". By using industrial-level
data, they ¯nd that many industries exhibit rising prices in response to a rise in the
nominal interest rate as the latter increases the cost of external ¯nance. Based on their
empirical ¯ndings and a partial equilibrium analysis, they presume that both a supply
channel (working capital) and a demand channel (price stickiness) a®ect the transmission
of monetary policy shocks. On the one hand, output should decline in response to a
rise in the nominal interest rate due to both of these channels. On the other hand,
these channels predict di®erent reactions of real marginal costs and, hence, opposing price
responses. According to the demand channel, a monetary contraction induces a decline in
aggregate demand and in the price level. As an opposite impulse, the positive innovation
in the nominal interest rate tends to increase the interest payments on loans which are
demanded for paying the wage bill in advance, i.e., for working capital. Therefore, the
in°ation reaction is unclear and depends on the impact of both channels on the real
marginal cost of price setting ¯rms. Consequently, Barth and Ramey (2000) point to the
still unanswered question of how monetary policy works in general equilibrium. This is
where this study proceeds.
The model is fairly standard in the sense that it combines commonly used ingredients
for building a monetary business cycle model.7 As already noted we depart from using
money growth as the exogenous policy variable and we presume that the central bank
controls the nominal interest rate. We apply a non-contingent interest rate policy and
identify monetary policy shocks with innovations to a pure interest rate rule. Aditionally,
we assume that the central bank accomodates money demand via open market operation.
We adopt this assumption, as most central banks in industrialzed countries conduct mon-
etary policy in terms of directives for a short-term nominal interest rate together with
accompanying open market operations. By speci¯ng the monetary and ¯scal regime in
5Examples are Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (1997), Rotemberg and Woodford (1998), McCallum (1999),
McGratten (1999), or Casares and McCallum (2000).
6In a few studies interest rate rules are considered for the analysis of agency costs e®ects on the monetary
transmission mechanism (see Bernanke et al., 1999, and Carlstrom and Fuerst, 2000).
7It is closely related to the model in Christiano et al.'s (1997) comparative analysis of sticky price and
limited participation models.
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this manner we obtain unique rational expectations equilibria.8 Along with Barth and
Ramey (2000), we further assume that two transmission channels, i.e., price stickiness
and working capital, are jointly at work. Applying Calvo's (1983) speci¯cation of price
staggering, in°ation evolves along with a simple forward looking 'New Keynesian Phillips
Curve'.
We computed the impulse response functions of the calibrated model for di®erent
degrees of price stickiness. Here, we ¯nd that the impulse responses to a contractionary
monetary policy shock are consistent with typical VAR results as, e.g., documented in
Christiano et al. (1999). This includes that in our model in°ation rises in response to
a positive nominal interest rate innovation. In accordance with the 'Cost Channel of
Monetary Transmission', it is the rise in real marginal costs induced by the increased cost
of loans which causes the ¯rms to raise their prices. However, the rise in the in°ation
rate should be considered in the general equilibrium framework. Coincident with a real
contraction, we ¯nd that the real return on capital declines. This implies that, ¯rst, the
real return on bonds must also decrease to meet the arbitrage-free condition and, second,
it requires that the in°ation rate rises in order to satisfy the Fisher equation. In summary,
the model generally replicates empirical e®ects of an interest rate innovation. Particularly,
the rise in the in°ation rate corresponds to the 'puzzling' price response in various VAR
studies. As a consequence we suggest to avoid the term 'monetary contraction' when a
positive interest rate innovation is meant. Our results imply that it might be necessary to
improve this widespread identi¯cation scheme for monetary policy actions in order to avoid
puzzling price responses in an otherwise standard business cycle model and in empirical
analyses. But this issue is clearly beyond the scope of this exercise.
In the subsequent section we describe the model and it's parametrization. In section 3
we discuss the transmission mechanism and present the model's responses to an interest
rate shock. Section 4 concludes.
2 The Model
In this section we present an economic environment based on the model in Christiano et
al. (1997). Our speci¯cation mainly departs with respect to two assumptions. First, the
monetary authority controls the nominal interest rate instead of the money growth rate.
Second, bonds are introduced together with an explicit speci¯cation of ¯scal policy. We
agree to the notion of Barth and Ramey (2000) and consider that both a supply channel
(working capital) and a demand channel (price stickiness) which are jointly at work.9
The economy consists of a government and numerous agents of three di®erent types:
households, ¯rms, and intermediaries. Money demand is induced by a cash-in-advance
constraint. Substantial real e®ects of changes in monetary variables are due to staggered
prices and intraperiod loans which are necessary for production. In contrast to many re-
cent business cycle analyses which employ a contingent policy rule, we specify monetary
policy as an non-contigent nominal interest rate rule. Accordingly, monetary policy shocks
8Woodford (1994) shows that such a combination of monetary and ¯scal policy can avoid the occurence
of real indeterminacy in a cash-in-advence economy.
9Christiano et al. (1997) additionally impose that households determine the amount of deposits prior
to the shock ('limited participation') to obtain a negative correlation between money growth and nominal
interest rates, i.e., the liquidity e®ect.
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are identi¯ed with innovations to an univariate nominal interest rate rule and money is en-
dogenously supplied by the monetary authority. The government issues one-period bonds
and the monetary authority accommodates money demand by an exchange of government
bonds with cash in open market operations. We were guided by the ¯ndings of Woodford
(1994) and adopt this kind of monetary and ¯scal policy in order to avoid real indeter-
minacy which usually arises when an interest rate rule without any nominal anchor is
applied.10
2.1. Households
Throughout the paper, nominal variables are denoted by upper-case letters, while real
variables are denoted by lower-case letters. The typical household is in¯nitely lived, with
preferences given by the expected value of a discounted stream of instantaneous utility
u (:) :
E0
" 1X
t=0
¯tu (ct; 1 ¡ lt)
#
; with ¯ 2 (0; 1); (1)
where E0 is the expectation operator conditional on the time 0 information set and ¯ is
the discount factor. Throughout we assume that instantaneous utility u (:) depends on a
Cobb-Douglas bundle of consumption c and leisure 1 ¡ l, and is characterized by constant
relative risk aversion (CRRA):
u (ct; 1 ¡ lt) = [c
°
t (1 ¡ lt)1¡° ]1¡¾ ¡ 1
1 ¡ ¾ ; with ° 2 (0; 1): (2)
At the beginning of period t; the representative household owns the entire stock of money
Mt in the economy. It must decide how much of this cash holdings to keep for contempora-
neous consumption and investment expenditures and how much to deposit at the ¯nancial
intermediary. Let Dt denote the amount of these deposits which will earn a nominal return
of it. The rest Mt ¡ Dt is allocated to purchases of consumption and investment goods.
We assume that both goods must be completely ¯nanced with non-deposited cash as well
as current labor income:
Pt(ct + et) · Mt ¡ Dt + Ptwtlt; (3)
where P and w denote the aggregate price level and the real wage, respectively. The
cash-in-advance constraint in (3) implies that there are no credit goods in the economy.
The household receives dividends -fi and the rental rate r on physical capital k as addi-
tional °ows from monopolistically competitive ¯rms indexed by i 2 (0; 1). In addition they
receive dividends -b as well as interest payments on deposits itDt from ¯nancial interme-
diaries. In period t the household chooses consumption Ptct and investment expenditures
Ptet, nominal money holdings Mt+1 and nominal riskless one-period pure discount bond
holdings (1+it+1)¡1Bt+1.11 Hence, cash and labor income left over from the goods market
10See Kerr and King (1996) for a discussion of the conditions for real determinacy in Keynesian models
with rational expectations and interest rate rules.
11Note that there is no non-negativity restriction on the level of the household's bond holdings.
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are carried over into the next period for money and bond holdings:
Mt+1 + (1 + it+1)
¡1 Bt+1 (4)
= Ptrtkt + (1 + it)Dt + Bt + (Mt ¡ Dt ¡ Pt(ct + et ¡ wtlt)) +
Z 1
0
-fitdi + -
b
t :
The household maximizes (1) subject to its cash-in-advance constraint (3), its budget
constraint (4), and the following condition for the accumulation of physical capital:
kt+1 = ©
µ
et
kt
¶
kt + (1 ¡ ±) kt; (5)
where ± denotes the depreciation rate of capital and ©(:) an increasing and concave ad-
justment cost function.12 Accordingly, investment expenditures e yield a gross output
of new capital goods © (e=k) k: The inclusion of adjustment costs permits to analyze the
cyclical behavior of the price q of physical capital.13 The household's ¯rst order conditions
for consumption, labor supply, deposit holdings, investment expenditures and for physical
capital are given by
¸t = °
[c°t (1 ¡ lt)1¡° ]1¡¾
ct(1 + it)
; (6)
wt¸t = (1 ¡ °) [c
°
t (1 ¡ lt)1¡° ]1¡¾
(1 ¡ lt)(1 + it) ; (7)
¸t
¯
= Et
·
¸t+1
1 + it+1
¼t+1
¸
; (8)
qt = (1 + it)©
0
µ
et
kt
¶¡1
; (9)
qt
¯
= Et
·
¸t+1
¸t
µ
rt+1 + qt+1
µ
©
µ
et+1
kt+1
¶
¡ ©0 et+1
kt+1
+ (1 ¡ ±)
¶¶¸
; (10)
where ¸ and ¼ denote the Lagrange multiplier for the budget constraint and the gross
in°ation rate, respectively. Furthermore, in an optimum the cash-in-advance constraint
(3) holds with equality for i > 0. Regarding the household's assets, the optimal choices
must also satisfy the following transversality conditions:
lim
t!1
¯tuctxt = 0; for x = k;m; b. (11)
2.2. Production
The ¯nal good, which is consumed and invested in the stock of physical capital, is an
aggregate of a continuum of di®erentiated goods produced by monopolistically competitive
¯rms indexed with i 2 (0; 1) . The aggregator of di®erentiated goods is de¯ned as follows:
yt =
·Z 1
0
y
(²¡1)
²
it di
¸ ²
²¡1
; with ² > 1; (12)
12Casares and McCallum (2000) recommend the introduction of similar adjustment cost functions in
order to generate reasonable investment responses in a sticky price model.
13The function © is chosen to obtain a steady state value of the capital price q equal to one.
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where y is the number of units of the ¯nal good, yi the amount produced by ¯rm i, and
² the constant elasticity of substitution between these di®erentiated goods. Let Pi and P
denote the price of good i set by ¯rm i and the price index for the ¯nal good. The demand
for each di®erentiated good is derived by minimizing the total costs of obtaining y subject
to (12):
yit =
µ
Pit
Pt
¶¡²
yt: (13)
Hence, the demand for good i increases with aggregate output and decreases in its relative
price. Regarding the price index P of the ¯nal good, cost minimization implies:
Pt =
·Z 1
0
P
(1¡²)
it di
¸ 1
1¡²
: (14)
A monopolistically competitive ¯rm i produces good i using labor and physical capital
according to the following technology with ¯xed cost of production · :
yit =
(
k®itl
1¡®
it ¡ ·; if k®itl1¡®it > ·
0 otherwise
with 0 < ® < 1; (15)
Entry and exit into the production sector is ruled out. The ¯rms rent labor and capital in
perfectly competitive factor markets. As the ¯rst main friction generating real e®ects of
monetary policy, we assume that wages must be paid in advance. For this, ¯rms borrow
the amount Z from ¯nancial intermediaries at the beginning of the period.
Zit = Ptwtlit: (16)
Repayment of loans occurs at the end of the period at the gross nominal interest rate
(1 + i). Accordingly, total costs of ¯rm i in period t consist of wages Ptwtlit, interest
payments on loans itZit and rent on physical capital Ptrtkit. Cost minimization for given
aggregate prices leads to real marginal costs which only depend on the real factor prices
and the nominal interest rate i on loans:
mct(wt; rt; it) =
®¡®
(1 ¡ ®)1¡® (1 + it)
1¡®w1¡®t r
®
t : (17)
As a second main friction, we introduce a nominal stickiness in form of staggered price
setting as developed by Calvo (1983). Each period ¯rms may reset their prices with the
probability 1¡Á independent of the time elapsed since the last price setting. The fraction
Á of ¯rms are assumed to adjust their previous period's prices according to the following
simple rule:
Pit = ¼Pit¡1; (18)
where ¼ denotes the average of the in°ation rate ¼t = Pt=Pt¡1. In each period a measure
1 ¡Á of randomly selected ¯rms set new prices ePit in order to maximize the value of their
shares
maxePit Et
" 1X
s=0
(¯Á)s #t;t+s
³
¼s ePityit+s ¡ Pt+smct+s(yit+s + ·)´
#
; (19)
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subject to yit+s =
³
¼s ePit´¡² P ²t+syt+s.
Since the ¯rms are owned by the households, the weights #t;t+s of dividend payments con-
sist of the marginal utilities of consumption: #t;t+s =
¸t+s
¸t
Pt
Pt+s
. The ¯rst order condition
for the optimal price setting of °ex-price producers is given by
ePit = ²² ¡ 1
P1
s=0 (¯Á)
s
Et
h
#t;t+syt+sP
²+1
t+s ¼
¡²smct+s
i
P1
s=0 (¯Á)
sEt
h
#t;t+syt+sP ²t+s¼
(1¡²)s
i : (20)
Using the simple price rule for the fraction Á of the ¯rms (18), the price index for the ¯nal
good as de¯ned in (14) evolves recursively over time
Pt =
h
Á (¼Pt¡1)
1¡² + (1 ¡ Á) eP 1¡²t i 11¡² : (21)
In the case of °exible prices (Á = 0) we obtain: Pit = Ptmct²=(²¡1): Hence, in a symmetric
equilibrium real marginal costs mc are constant over time when prices are °exible (mct =
(² ¡ 1)=²), while they vary in the sticky price version of the model. In the latter case the
in°ation rate evolves according the following linear di®erence equation which is derived in
Appendix A: b¼t = Â cmct + ¯Et[b¼t+1].14 At the end of the period the nominal pro¯ts -fit
of ¯rm i are distributed to the household which owns the ¯rm.
-fit = Pityit ¡ Ptmct(yit + ·): (22)
All ¯rms face the identical production technology and same prices for the factor inputs. In
view of this symmetry the cost minimizing factor demand schedules can be written with
aggregate quantities
wt =mct
(1 ¡ ®) k®t l¡®t
1 + it
; (23)
rt =mct®k
®¡1
t l
1¡®
t : (24)
2.3. Fiscal and Monetary Policy
We consider two kinds of public liabilities, i.e., monetary balances and one-period dis-
count bonds. That is, the amount of borrowing in period t is Et
h
(1 + it+1)
¡1
i
Bt+1 and
the amount to be repaid in period t + 1 is Bt+1. The revenues of issuing public liabili-
ties (debt and money) net of government spending g is transferred lump-sum (¿ ) to the
intermediaries.15 The government's period-by-period budget constraint is given by
Pt¿t + Ptgt + Mt + Bt = (1 + it+1)
¡1 Bt+1 + Mt+1: (25)
For a discussion of the government's solvency, we de¯ne the total nominal government
liabilities Wt at the beginning of period t : Wt = Mt + Bt. The government's period-by-
14The term Â denotes a positive constant and bx (x = ¼;mc) gives the percent deviation of variable x
from its steady state value x : bxt = log(xt=x).
15The lump-sum injection of net reciepts to ¯nancial intermediaries is also assumed by Carlstrom and
Fuerst (1995) and is commonly applied in limited-partizipation models (see, e.g., Christiano et al., 1997).
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period budget constraint (25) can then be rewritten as
Wt + Pt(¿t + gt) +
it+1
1 + it+1
Bt+1 = Wt+1: (26)
We claim that the combined ¯scal and monetary policy of the government must satis-
¯es a no-Ponzi ¯nance or solvency constraint. It states that the present value of total
outstanding government liabilities converges to zero:
lim
j!1
jY
l=1
1
1 + it+l
Wt+j = 0: (27)
The solvency constraint (27) implies that the present value discounted value of future re-
ceipts net of interest payments and government expenditures should allow the government
to pay back its outstanding liabilities. Accordingly, the solvency constraint can also be
expressed as an intertemporal budget constraint:
Wt =
1X
l=0
lY
j=1
1
1 + it+j
· ¡it+l+1
1 + it+l+1
Bt+l+1 ¡ pt+l(¿t + gt)
¸
: (28)
We assume that the monetary authority sets the short run nominal interest rate exoge-
nously. As we focus on the monetary transmission mechanism we identify monetary pol-
icy shocks with innovations to a pure or 'open-loop' nominal interest rate rule.16 This
non-contingent policy speci¯cation di®ers from interest rate rules entailing endogenous
variables like the in°ation rate or output (such as the prominent Taylor-rule):
log it = ½i log it¡1 + (1 ¡ ½i) log i + "it; (29)
where i denotes the stationary value of the nominal interest rate. The autoregressive
parameter ½i is smaller than one and the innovations "i are i.i.d., with "i » N (0; ¾2i ).
The monetary authority accommodates changes in money demand through open market
operations. Here, money balances are traded in exchange for riskless debt instruments,
namely, one-period government bonds:
Mt+1 ¡ Mt = ¡(Bt+1 ¡ Bt): (30)
Hence, the amount of beginning-of-period total nominal government liabilities W is con-
stant over time. This speci¯cation of public liabilities might also be interpreted as a
balanced-budget condition, where the primary surplus equals the interest payments on
outstanding bonds.17 Regarding the government expenditures, we assume that the govern-
ment sets the path for its spendings fgtg1t=0 exogenously. Since this paper is not concerned
with the analysis of ¯scal shocks, we assume that the government expenditures g are ¯xed
and amount a constant fraction of the steady state value of GDP. The government budget
16The pure interest rate rule is also recently applied in Carlstrom and Fuerst (2000).
17An analysis of the price level determination with a similar budget rule and di®erent monetary policy
regimes is presented by Schmith-Grohe and Uribe (2000).
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constraint (25) can then be rewritten as:
¡it+1Bt+1 = (1 + it+1)Pt(¿t + g): (31)
By inspecting the intertemporal government budget constraint (28), it can be immediately
seen that given our speci¯cation of ¯scal and monetary policy the government's solvency
constraint (27) is ful¯lled in every period.18
2.4. Financial Intermediation
The ¯nancial intermediaries are perfectly competitive. In each period t, they receive
deposits Dt from households and lump-sum injections Pt¿t from the monetary authority.
These funds are supplied as loans Zt to the ¯rms at the gross nominal interest rate (1 + it).
At the end of the period, the deposits Dt together with the interest itDt are repaid and
the intermediary pro¯ts -bt are distributed to the owners, i.e., the households:
19
-bt = (1 ¡ it)Dt ¡ (1 ¡ it)Zt + Pt¿t: (32)
2.5. Rational Expectation Equilibrium
In order to induce stationarity, the model is expressed in real terms: dt = Dt=Pt; zt =
Zt=Pt; mt = Mt=Pt¡1; bt = Bt=Pt¡1. The endogenous state of the economy is represented
by values taken by s = (k;m; b). Though we introduced a stochastic process for the nomi-
nal interest rate, we restrict our attention to equilibria with positive values of the nominal
interest rate so that the household's cash-in-advance (3) constraint always binds. A ratio-
nal expectation equilibrium, then, consists of an allocation fct; et; lt; dt; kt+1;mt+1; bt+1; ¿t; gtg1t=0,
a sequence of prices and costates f¼t; wt; rt;mct; qt; ¸t; itg1t=0 such that
(i) The household's ¯rst order conditions (6)-(10) together with the cash-in-advance con-
straint (3), the capital accumulation equation (5) and the transversality conditions are
satis¯ed. (ii) The factor demand conditions (23) and (24) as well as the pricing equations
(20) and (21) are ful¯lled. (iii) The government budget constraint (25) is satis¯ed, while
the nominal interest rate is given by the autoregressive process (29) and government lia-
bilities evolve according to (30). (v) The markets for intermediated funds and ¯nal output
clear, i.e., the following conditions hold:
yt = ct + et + gt; (33)
wtlt = dt + ¿t: (34)
2.6. Model Parametrization
The model is calibrated at the non-stochastic balanced growth path by matching the
model's parameter values with their empirical counterparts. The values for the preference
and technology parameters are fairly standard in the business cycle literature.20 The
discount factor of households ¯ is set equal to 1:03¡0:25. The production elasticity of
18As noted by Benhabib et al. (1999), such a monetary-¯scal regime is a 'Ricardian' policy following
the de¯nition of Benhabib et al. (1998).
19In equilibrium pro¯ts -bt equal Pt¿tit:
20See, e.g., Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992).
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capital ® is set equal to 0.36. Quarterly depreciation of physical capital ± is assigned a
value of 0.0212. Steady state labor input is equal to 0.33 implying a value of 0.25 for
the consumption expenditure share in the utility function ° .21 The parameter ¾ which
governs the risk aversion of the household is set to 2.
The elasticity of the price of capital with respect to the investment ratio, ©00 ¢( ek )=©0; is
set to -0.25. This value is taken from Bernanke et al. (1998) where monetary policy shocks
are also identi¯ed with innovations to the nominal interest rate. Following Christiano et
al. (1997), the price elasticity of demand ² is assigned a value of 6, implying a mark-up
equal to 1.2.22 The value for the share of government expenditures g=y = 21% is taken
from Edelberg et al. (1998). The parameter of the AR1 process for the federal funds rate
(½i = 0:934) and the steady state in°ation rate (¼ = 1:0189) are estimated with time series
from 1984-1998. We choose this period to ensure a stable monetary policy regime.
In the business cycle literature, the probability for a retailer to receive a price signal
1 ¡ Á is often assigned a value of 0.25.23 This value accords to the estimates of Gali and
Gertler (1999) and is consistent with an average period of one year between two price
adjustments. As the in°ation's response to a monetary policy shock is of central interest
in this paper, we apply three di®erent values (0.25, 0.5, 0.75) for the fraction 1 ¡ Á of the
price adjusting ¯rms.24
Table 1: Values of Preference and Technological Parameters
Parameter Descriptions Value
® Production Elasticity of Capital 0.36
¾ Relative Risk Aversion 2
² Substitution Elasticity of Retail Goods 6
¯ Discount Rate 0.9926
± Depreciation Rate of Physical Capital 0.0212
©00 ek =©
0 Elasticity of Capital Adjustment Cost -0.25
g=y Government Expenditure Share 0.21
l Steady State Labor Supply 0.33
½i Autoregressive Parameter 0.934
¼ Steady State In°ation 1.0189
1 ¡ Á Probability of Price Adjustment 0.25, 0.5, 0.75
3 Quantitative Properties
The equilibrium conditions are transformed in stationary variables and are log-linearized
at the steady state.25 After calibrating the model, we solved it recursively applying the
method of King et al. (1987). Regarding the dynamic properties of the model, we ¯nd that
the rational expectations equilibrium of the linear model is unique. Real determinacy is
21The value 0.25 for ° is also choosen by Cooley aand Nam (1998) for their nominal business cycle model.
22Given the value of the elasticity ², the ¯x costs of production can be calculated with: · = (² ¡ 1)¡1 y:
23See, e.g., Jeanne (1998), and Gali and Monacelli (2000).
24These values for the fraction 1¡ Á are also applied in Yun (1996).
25The log-linear model is presented in Appendix B.
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Figure 1: Impulse Responses to a Positive Interest Rate Innovation (i;M=P; l; y)
a robust feature of our model for several parameters variations over a range of reasonable
values. This property is consistent with the results of Woodford (1994). He shows in
a cash-in-advance economy that a combination of an interest rate peg and open market
operations, which is comparable to our speci¯cation of monetary and ¯scal policy, leads
to unique rational expectations equilibria. It should be noted that this kind of monetary
and ¯scal policy is not proposed in order to avoid nominal indeterminacy, in the sense of
Patinkin (1949) or Sargent and Wallace (1975), which commonly arises when the nominal
interest rate is pegged.
3.1. Aggregate E®ects of Interest Rate Shocks
For an investigation of the particular transmission mechanism of the calibrated model,
we computed the impulse responses of the model to policy shocks, i.e., innovations to the
nominal interest rate rule (29). The impulse responses presented in this paper refer to
percent deviations of the variables from their steady state values. The Figures 1-3 present
impulse responses of the model for three di®erent degrees of price stickiness. Particularly,
we vary the value of the probability Á for the ¯rms of not receiving a price signal (Á = 0:25;
0:5; 0:75), where a larger value of Á indicates a higher degree of price stickiness.
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Figure 2: Impulse Responses to a Positive Interest Rate Innovation (c; e; k; q)
Figure 1 and 2 present macroeconomic reactions to a nominal interest rate shock which
are consistent with conventional expectations about monetary policy e®ects. Figure 1B
displays that the monetary policy shock leads to a decline in liquidity, as the persistent
rise in the nominal interest rate is associated with reduced holdings of real balances.
Induced by the increased cost of loans, the ¯rms' loan demand falls and employment
declines (Figure 1C). Consequently, output falls immediately as can be seen from Figure
1D. Surprisingly, the decline in output is even stronger when prices are less sticky. This
counterintuitive result is a direct consequence of the two main sources of non-neutrality
which are jointly at work in this model. Lump-sum transfers, which are determined by the
government budget constraint (31), rise as the negative amount of bonds is reduced while
the nominal interest rate increases.26 This expansionary impact is enhanced by higher
degrees of price stickiness and leads to a smaller contraction in output which is caused by
the working capital channel.
In equilibrium, the real contraction is accompanied by a reduced aggregate demand of
the households. According to their cash constraint (3), the demand for both types of goods,
26The respective impulse response functions are presented in Appendix C.
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i.e., the consumption and investment expenditures, fall symmetrically in response to the
monetary contraction (Figure 2A and B). As a direct consequence of reduced investment
expenditures, the price as well as the stock of physical capital decreases as shown in
Figure 2C and D. Concerning the assets of the households, the portfolio adjustments can
immediately be deduced from the aforementioned responses.27 Consistent with the reduced
real balance holdings and the associated open market exchanges, real bond holdings rise
in response to the interest rate shock. At the same time the amount of deposits, which
earn the same interest as bonds, is lowered as employment and wages fall in equilibrium
as can be seen from the market clearing condition for intermediated funds (34).
Up to this point, it can be summarized that our model's responses to interest rate
shocks are consistent with conventional wisdom and with VAR evidence. Regarding the
aggregate production, the model predicts that output responds persistently and even in
a hump-shaped manner in the case of moderate price stickiness. This pattern as well as
the magnitude of the output response functions are comparable to the impulse response
functions of typical VAR estimates.28
3.2. Real Marginal Cost and In°ation
In the following subsection, we take a closer look at the responses of factor prices, real
marginal cost and the in°ation rate to an interest rate shock. This strategy follows Barth
and Ramey (2000) who study the impact of monetary policy shocks on ¯rms' optimal price
setting in a partial equilibrium model. Their ¯rst order condition for the price setters
corresponds to the forward looking pricing equation in our model which is derived from
the conditions (20) and (21). This so-called 'New Keynesian Phillips Curve' states that
the current in°ation depends on current real marginal cost and expected future in°ation:29
b¼t = Â cmct + ¯Et [b¼t+1] ; with Â > 0; (35)
where bx (x = ¼;mc) denotes the percent deviations from steady state value x. For a given
value of expected future in°ation, equation (35) predicts that in°ation should fall when
real marginal cost decreases. According to the ¯rm's cost minimizing condition (17), real
marginal cost depends positively on real factor prices and the nominal interest rate. The
linearly transformed version of this condition is given by:
cmct = (1 ¡ ®) i
1 + i
bit + (1 ¡ ®) bwt + ®brt, with 0 < ® < 1: (36)
Obviously, the behavior of in°ation depends on cost components (i; w; r) which may reveal
di®erent responses after a monetary contraction. Given our monetary policy speci¯cation,
a monetary tightening always tends to raise real marginal costs due to the rise in the
nominal interest rate. Thus, for real marginal cost and, therefore, for the in°ation rate
response it is decisive whether the factor prices, i.e., real wages w and the rental rate on
capital r, decline in response to a monetary contraction and to what extent.
27They are also displayed in Appendix C.
28See Bernanke and Mihov (1998), and Christiano et al. (1996, 1999).
29The parameter Â depends on the probability Á of receiving a price signal and the discount factor
¯ : Â= (1¡ Á) (1¡ ¯Á)Á¡1(see Appendix A).
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Given the standard properties of the production function (15), the decreased stock
of physical capital tends to raise the rental rate on capital, while the latter is lowered
by the decline in employment. Figure 3A reveals that these opposing e®ects result in a
rising rental rate in the case of higher price stickiness (Á = 0:75), whereas the rental rate
initially falls when prices are more °exible.30 No matter which degree of price stickiness
prevails, real wages always decline in response to a monetary contraction (Figure 3B).
When prices are not too sticky (Á < 0:75), both factor price reactions would predict a
decrease of real marginal cost in the absence of interest payments on loans. In our model,
the nominal interest rate does a®ect real marginal cost according to (36) and, as displayed
in Figure 3C, causes a rise of the real marginal cost for all three degrees of price stickiness.
The increase in real marginal cost leads to declining real pro¯ts, as can be seen from the
impulse response function of the ¯rms' pro¯ts in Appendix C. This feature of our model is
consistent with empirical ¯ndings, which can not be replicated by a standard sticky price
model with money growth shocks.31
The most remarkable property of the model's transmission mechanism is presented in
Figure 3D. Here, it can be observed that the in°ation rate rises in response to a positive
innovation to the nominal interest rate. It turns out that this behavior is persistent and
robust. Moreover, after one year the responses of the in°ation rate are almost identical
for all three degrees of price stickiness. Only in the ¯rst periods we ¯nd di®erences in the
in°ation reactions which are small and opposed to the di®erences in the real marginal cost
responses (Figure 3C). However, the response of in°ation in our model is consistent with
the persistent rise in the price level commonly found in VARs when a sensitive price index
is omitted.32
So far, it can be proposed that it is the rise in the nominal interest rate as a cost
component which is responsible for the unusual response of the in°ation rate to a monetary
contraction. Barth and Ramey (2000) call this e®ect of monetary policy on the in°ation
rate the 'Cost Channel of Monetary Transmission'. In general equilibrium, the rise in the
in°ation rate is consistent with the household's arbitrage-free condition (10) which can be
interpreted as a Fisher equation containing the variable price q of physical capital. This
¯rst order condition for the household's asset holdings can be rewritten as:
Et
·
1 + it+1
¼t+1
¸
= Et
·
(rt+1 + qt+1³t+1)
qt
¸
; (37)
with ³t = ©
µ
et
kt
¶
¡ ©0 et
kt
+ (1 ¡ ±) ;
where ³ is positive and weighs the price of capital depending on the elasticity of the
adjustment cost function ©.33 The condition (37) claims that the expected value of the
total real return on capital equals the expected real interest rate on bonds. Thus, when
the total real return on capital is expected to fall in response to an increase in the nominal
30The divergence in the responses of the rental rate are due to the di®erent weights of the expansionary
e®ect of rising lump-sum transfers. Since investments are assumed to be cash-goods, lump-sum transfers
directly a®ect the price of capital as well as the rental rate on capital.
31See Christiano et al. (1997) for a critical discussion of sticky price models.
32See, e.g., Christiano et al. (1996).
33Obviously, ³ is equal to 1¡ ± in the steady state.
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Figure 3: Impulse Responses to a Positive Interest Rate Innovation (r; w;mc; ¼)
interest rate, the expected value of the in°ation rate must rise in order to ensure the
equality.34 This implies that, holding the other variables constant, higher expected values
of the rental rate r should be accompanied by lower expected values of in°ation. This
pattern can be observed in Figure 3A and D.
4 Conclusion
The majority of monetary business cycle models treats a broad monetary aggregate as
an exogenous policy measure of the central bank, whereas in the empirical literature the
federal funds rate is mostly applied as the policy measure. This paper tries to overcome
this disparity and presents a monetary business cycle model which allows to examine the
e®ects of innovations to a non-contingent nominal interest rate rule while ensuring real
determinacy. In addition to a working capital assumption we consider staggered price
setting which enables real marginal costs to vary. It is shown that the model is able
to replicate typical responses to interest rate shocks of monetary VARs. Consistent with
Barth and Ramey's (2000) 'Costs Channel of Monetary Transmission', we particularly ¯nd
34This argument is con¯rmed by the impulse response of the real return on bonds given in Appendix C.
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that real marginal costs and in°ation rise in response to positive interest rate innovation.
As the model's transmission mechanism provides a rationale for the so-called price puzzle
in monetary VARs, we suggest that the latter should not be treated as an empirical
anomaly. Obviously, this result is incompatible with conventional monetary theory and
should not be taken as an advice to rethink monetary theory. Though, it casts doubt
on the appropriateness of the measures for an unanticipated change in monetary policy,
which are applied in this model and in many VARs.
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Appendix
Appendix A: Derivation of the New Keynesian Phillips Curve
We start by linearizing equation (21), which determines the evolution of the price index
P . For this, it is transformed in stationary variables:
1 =
·
Á
³
¼¼¡1t
´1¡²
+ (1 ¡ Á) ePqt1¡²¸ 11¡² ;with ePqt = ePit
Pt
and ¼t =
Pt
Pt¡1
; (A1)
where bx denotes the percent deviation of x from its steady state value x. Linearization of
(A1) at the steady state leads to:
Á
1 ¡ Áb¼t = beP qt. (A2)
Further, we need the ¯rst order condition for the ¯rm's optimal price ePit (20). For the
linearization at the steady state, it is also transformed in stationary variables:
ePqt ² ¡ 1
²
1X
s=0
(¯Á)s Et
h
#t;t+syt+s¼
²
t;t+s¼
(1¡²)s
i
=
1X
s=0
(¯Á)sEt
h
#t;t+syt+s¼
²+1
t;t+smct+s¼
¡²s
i
;
(A3)
where ¼t;t+s denotes a cumulative in°ation rate: ¼t;t+s =
Pt+s
Pt
=
sQ
k=1
¼t+k: Linearizing
equation (A3) at the perfect foresight steady state we obtain:
1X
s=0
(¯Á)s eP q ² ¡ 1
²
y¼(1¡²)s¼s(²¡1)Et
·b#t;t+s + byt+s + ²b¼t;t+s + beP qt¸ (A4)
=
1X
s=0
(¯Á)smcy¼¡²s¼s²Et
hb#t;t+s + byt+s + (² + 1) b¼t;t+s + cmct+si :
Using that eP q ²¡1² = mc holds in the steady state and substituting eP q out with (A2),
equation (A4) can be simpli¯ed to:
Á
(1 ¡ Á) b¼t = (1 ¡ ¯Á)
1X
s=0
(¯Á)sEt [b¼t;t+s + cmct+s ] : (A5)
Taking the period t + 1 expression for equation (A5) times ¯Á and substracting it from
(A5), gives:
Á
(1 ¡ Á) (b¼t ¡ ¯ÁEt [b¼t+1]) = (1 ¡ ¯Á)
Ã cmct ¡ ¯Á 1X
s=0
(¯Á)sEt [¡b¼t+1]
!
: (A6)
Equation (A6) can then be rewritten, leading to the 'New Keynesian Phillips Curve' in
(35): b¼t = Â cmct + ¯Et [b¼t+1] ; with Â = (1 ¡ Á) (1 ¡ ¯Á) Á¡1: (A7)
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Appendix B: The Log-linear Model
State variables: kt, mt ´ MtPt¡1 ; bt = Btpt¡1
Costates: ¸t, qt; pi
Control variables: c; l; e; w; r; z; ¿;mc
Exogenous states: i
Dynamic Equations:
k^t+1 ¡ (1 ¡ Á0 ek )k^t = Á
0(:)
e
k
e^t (A8)
¯Á00
µ
e
k
¶2
k^t+1 + ^¸t+1 + ¯
µ
1 ¡ Á0 e
k
¶
q^t+1 ¡ ^¸t ¡ q^t = ¯Á00
µ
e
k
¶2
e^t+1 ¡ ¯
q
rr^t+1
¡^¸t+1 + ^¸t + ¼^t+1 = i
1 + i
i^t+1
b^t+1 =
¿
¿ + g
b¿t ¡ 1
1 + i
i^t+1
¡ Á
(1 ¡ Á) (1 ¡ ¯Á)¯b¼t+1 + Á(1 ¡ Á) (1 ¡ ¯Á) b¼t = cmct
m bmt+1 + bb^t+1 ¡ m
¼
bmt ¡ b
¼
b^t +
µ
m + b
¼
¶
¼^t = 0
Contemporaneous Equations:
[(1 ¡ ¾)° ¡ 1] c^t ¡ (1 ¡ ¾)(1 ¡ °) l
1 ¡ l
blt = b¸t + i
1 + i
i^t (A9)
(1 ¡ ¾)°c^t ¡ [(1 ¡ ¾)(1 ¡ °) ¡ 1] l
1 ¡ l
blt ¡ bwt = b¸t + i
1 + i
i^t
ebet + cbct ¡ wlblt ¡ wl bwt + zbzt = m
¼
bmt ¡ m¼ b¼t
®l^t + w^t ¡ cmct =®k^t ¡ i
1 + i
i^t
¡(1 ¡ ®)l^t + r^t ¡ cmct =¡(1 ¡ ®)k^t
Á00
Á0
e
k
e^t =
Á00
Á0
e
k
k^t ¡ q^t +
i
1 + i
i^t
c
y
c^t ¡ (1 ¡ ®)l^t + e
y
bet =®bkt
wll^t + wlw^t ¡ zz^t + ¿ b¿t =0
18
Appendix C: Additional Impulse Response Functions
Impulse Responses to a Positive Interest Rate Innovation (B=P; ¿; d; z; (1 + i)¼¡1;-f=P ).
Note that, the impulse responses of government transfers and real bonds indicate increases
as the steady state values are negative. The responses of the pro¯ts are given in absolute
values.
19
References
Barth, Mike, and Valerie, Ramey, 2000, The Cost Channel of Monetary Transmis-
sion, NBER Working Paper, no. 7675.
Benhabib, J., Schmidt-Grohe, S. and M. Uribe, 1998, Monetary Policy and Mul-
tiple Equilibria, Manuscript, New York University.
, , and , 1999, The Perils of Taylor Rules, Manuscript, New York University.
Bernanke, B.S., M. Gertler, and S. Gilchrist, 1998, The Financial Accelerator in a
Quantitative Business Cycle Framework, NBER Working Paper, no. 6455.
Bernanke, B.S., and I. Mihov, 1998, Measuring Monetary Policy, Quarterly Journal
of Economics, 869-901.
Bergin, P., and R.C. Feenstra, 1998, Staggered Price Setting and Endogenous Per-
sistence, NBER Working Paper, no. 6429.
Calvo, G., 1983, Staggered Prices in a Utility-Maximizing Framework, Journal of Mon-
etary Economics, vol. 12, 383-398.
Carlstrom, C.T., and T.S. Fuerst, 1995, Interest Rate Rules vs. Money Growth Rules:
A Welfare Comparison in a Cash-in-advance Economy, Journal of Monetary Eco-
nomics, vol. 36, 247-267.
, and , 2000, Money Growth Rules and Price Level Determinancy, Working Pa-
per, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.
Casares, M., and B. McCallum, 2000, An Optimizing IS-LM Framework with En-
dogenous Investment, NBER Working Paper, no. 7908.
Chari, V.V., P.J. Kehoe and E.R. McGrattan, 1996, Sticky Price Models of the
Business Cycle: Can the Contract Multiplier Solve the Persistence Problem?, Re-
search Department Sta® Report 217, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
Christiano, J.L., and M. Eichenbaum, 1992, Liquidity E®ects and the Monetary Trans-
mission Mechanism, American Economic Review, vol. 82, 346-53.
Christiano, J.L., M. Eichenbaum, and C.L. Evans, 1996, The E®ects of Monetary
Policy Shocks: Evidence from the Flow of Funds, Review of Economics and Statistics,
vol. 78, 16-35.
, , and , 1997a, Sticky price and Limited Participation Models of Money: A
Comparison, European Economic Review, vol. 41, 1201-49.
, , and , 1999, Monetary Policy Shocks: What Have We Learned and to What
End?, in: M. Woodford and J.B. Taylor (eds.), Handbook of Macroeconomics, Am-
sterdam: North-Holland.
20
Clarida, R., J. Gali, and M. Gertler, 1997, Monetary Policy Rules and Macroeco-
nomic Stability: Evidence and Some Theory, NBER Working Paper, no. 6442.
Cooley, T., and K. Nam, 1998, Asymmetric Information, Financial Intermediation,
and Business Cycles, Economic Theory, 599-620.
Edelberg, W., M. Eichenbaum, and J.D.M. Fisher, 1999, Understanding the Ef-
fects of Shocks to Government Purchases, Review of Economic Dynamics, 166-206.
Fuerst, T.S., 1992, Liquidity, Loanable Funds, and Real Activity, Journal of Monetary
Economics, vol. 29, 3-24.
Gali, J., and T. Monacelli, Optimal Monetary Policy and Exchange Rate Volatility in
a Small Open Economy, Manuscript, University Pompeu Fabra.
Gali, J., and M. Gertler, 1999, In°ation Dynamics: A Structural Econometric Analy-
sis, Journal of Monetary Economics, vol. 44, 195-222.
Hanson, M.S., 2000, The 'Price Puzzle' Reconsidered, Manuscript, Wesleyan University.
Huang, Kevin X.D., and Zheng Liu, 1999, Staggered Contracts and Business Cycle
Persistence, Institute for Empirical Macroeconomics, Federal Reserve Bank of Min-
neapolis, Discussion Paper 127.
Jeanne, O., 1998, Generating Real Persistent E®ects of Monetary Policy: How much
Nominal Rigidity Do We Really Need?, European Economic Review, vol. 42, 1009-
1032.
Kerr, W., and R.G. King, 1996, Limits on Interest Rate Rules in the IS Model, Fed-
eral Reseve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly, vol. 82, 47-75.
King, R.G, Plosser, C.I., and S.T. Rebelo, 1987, Production, Growth and Business
Cycles: Technical Appendix, Computational Economics, University of Rochester,
Working Paper.
Lucas, R.E. Jr., 1990, Liquidity and Interest Rates, Journal of Economic Theory, vol.
50, 237-264.
McCallum, B.T., 1999, Analysis of Monetary Transmission Mechanism: Methodologi-
cal Issues, NBER Working Paper, no. 7395.
McGrattan, E.R., 1999, Predicting the E®ects of Federal Reserve Policy in a Sticky-
Price Model: An Analytical Approach, Research Department Working Paper 598,
Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
Patinkin, D., The Indeterminacy of Absolute Prices in Classical Economic Theory, Econo-
metrica, vol. 17, 1-27.
Rotemberg, J., and M. Woodford, 1998, Interest Rate Rules in an Estimated Sticky
Price Model, NBER Working Paper, no. 6618.
21
Sargent, T.J., and N. Wallace, 1995, Rational Expectations, the Optimal Monetary
Instrument and the Optimal Money Supply Rule, Journal of Political Economy, vol.
83, 241-254.
Schmidt-Grohe, S. and M. Uribe, 2000, Price Level Determinacy and Monetary Pol-
icy under a Balanced-Budget Requirement, Journal of Monetary Economics, vol. 45,
211-246.
Sims, C.A., 1992, Interpreting the Macroeconomic Time Series Facts: The E®ects of
Monetary Policy, European Economic Review, vol. 36, 975-1000.
Uhlig, H., 1999, What are the e®ects of Monetary Policy? Results from an Agnostic
Identi¯cation Procedure, CentER Discussion Paper Nr. 28, Tilburg University.
Woodford, M., 1994, Monetary Policy and Price Level Determinacy in a Cash-in-advance
Economy, Economic Theory, vol. 4., 345-380.
Yun, Tack, 1996, Nominal Price Rigidity, Money Supply Endogeneity, and Business Cy-
cles, Journal of Monetary Economics, vol. 37, 345-370.
22
  
Authors: Andreas Schabert 
 
Title: Interest Rate Policy and the Price Puzzle in a Quantitative Business Cycle Model 
 
Reihe Ökonomie / Economics Series 95 
 
Editor: Robert M. Kunst (Econometrics) 
Associate Editors: Walter Fisher (Macroeconomics), Klaus Ritzberger (Microeconomics)  
 
ISSN: 1605-7996 
© 2001 by the Department of Economics, Institute for Advanced Studies (IHS), 
Stumpergasse 56, A-1060 Vienna · ( +43 1 59991-0 · Fax +43 1 5970635 · http://www.ihs.ac.at  
 
 ISSN: 1605-7996 
 
